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Abstract 
Background: A malaria eradication goal has been proposed, at the same time as a new global strategy and imple-
mentation framework. Countries are considering the strategies and tools that will enable progress towards malaria 
goals. The eliminating malaria case-study series reports were reviewed to identify successful programme manage-
ment components using a cross-case study analytic approach.
Methods: Nine out of ten case-study reports were included in the analysis (Bhutan, Cape Verde, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Turkmenistan). A conceptual framework for malaria elimination programme 
management was developed and data were extracted and synthesized. Findings were reviewed at a consultative 
workshop, which led to a revision of the framework and further data extraction and synthesis. Success factors of 
implementation, programme choices and changes, and enabling factors were distilled.
Results: Decentralized programmes enhanced engagement in malaria elimination by sub-national units and com-
munities. Integration of the malaria programme into other health services was also common. Decentralization and 
integration were often challenging due to the skill and experience levels of newly tasked staff. Accountability for 
programme impact was not clarified for most programmes. Motivation of work force was a key factor in maintaining 
programme quality but there were few clear, detailed strategies provided. Different incentive schemes targeted vari-
ous stakeholders. Training and supervision, although not well described, were prioritized by most programmes. Multi-
sectoral collaboration helped some programmes share information, build strategies and interventions and achieve 
a higher quality of implementation. In most cases programme action was spurred by malaria outbreaks or a new 
elimination goal with strong leadership. Some programmes showed high capacity for flexibility through introduc-
tion of new strategies and tools. Several case-studies described methods for monitoring implementation quality and 
coverage; however analysis and feedback to those implementing malaria elimination in the periphery was not well 
described. Political commitment and sustained financing contributed to malaria programme success. Consistency of 
malaria programmes depends on political commitment, human and financial resources, and leadership. Operational 
capacity of the programme and the overall health system structure and strength are also important aspects.
Conclusions: Malaria eradication will require adaptive, well-managed malaria programmes that are able to tailor 
implementation of evidence-based strategies, founded upon strong sub-national surveillance and response, with 
adequate funding and human resources.
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Background
Global goals for malaria control, elimination and even-
tual eradication have evolved rapidly in the last year. A 
global goal of malaria eradication by 2040 was recently 
proposed [1], and at the same time, a new Global Tech-
nical Strategy for Malaria (GTS) was launched by WHO 
in 2015 and endorsed by all member states, providing the 
operational framework for achievement of elimination 
and stating an elimination goal of 35 countries by 2030 
[2]. The overarching implementation and action frame-
work, Action and Investment to Defeat Malaria (AIM) by 
Roll Back Malaria, was also launched in 2015 [3]. Many 
malaria programmes around the world are considering 
or committing to malaria elimination and are working to 
integrate the GTS and AIM principles into their national 
malaria programme strategy and framework. It is also 
likely that during this process, countries are consider-
ing the internal and external factors that may propel or 
impede progress towards elimination.
There are important challenges to address for both the 
long-term goal of global malaria eradication, as well as 
national elimination efforts. As highlighted in the GTS, 
countries must ensure political commitment and financ-
ing, and address major technical challenges, such as drug 
and insecticide resistance [2]. An overarching challenge 
at the national level is the inadequate performance of 
health systems. Deficiencies in health system structure 
may take the form of weak surveillance, inadequate tools 
for diagnosis and treatment, poor management of supply 
chains, an unregulated private health sector, weak moni-
toring and evaluation, and lack of adequate technical and 
human resource capacity. Ensuring that national malaria 
programmes have personnel with the appropriate level 
of programme management skills and tools to supervise 
and coordinate high quality implementation and evalua-
tion is essential to achieving elimination, and, ultimately, 
eradication [2].
Today’s eradication goal is not the first effort to rid 
the world of malaria. The first attempt was made dur-
ing the Global Malaria Eradication Programme (GMEP) 
(1955–1970). However, there are some major differences 
between that programme and present day efforts. The 
GMEP was based on vertical, time-limited interventions 
deployed through mainly centralized health systems, 
where authority was held mostly at the national level. 
In contrast, today’s health systems are mainly decen-
tralized and malaria programmes are integrated into 
vector-borne disease control programmes [4]. While 
verticality brought some benefits, such as greater control 
and potential for motivation of staff, it also meant that 
activities were often not integrated with broader com-
municable disease activities, and lacked a clear, strategic 
component of surveillance with effective response pack-
ages, which created major challenges for achieving effec-
tiveness and sustainability. Attrition of professional staff 
was increasingly a problem as GMEP progressed; the 
work became rote and routine and less about problem-
solving. Without strategies in place to maintain motiva-
tion, trained staff left country programmes [4]. In some 
cases, national programmes following GMEP guidance 
did not adequately build up systems in country for cap-
turing epidemiological data that could identify changing 
transmission patterns, or failed to evaluate the impact of 
interventions, leading to campaigns that became unable 
to reorient or adapt to changing contexts [4]. In addition, 
there was no agenda for research and development to 
accompany the GMEP. Therefore, as technical challenges 
such as drug and insecticide resistance arose, solutions 
were not forthcoming [5]. As financing for malaria eradi-
cation was withdrawn in the 1970s and 1980s, progress 
toward eradication stalled.
The lessons from the GMEP, as well as the framework 
of the GTS and the AIM and the new eradication goal, all 
speak to the importance of strong programme manage-
ment as a central component for the success of countries 
aiming to achieve malaria elimination. The Eliminat-
ing Case-Study Series by the WHO Global Malaria Pro-
gramme and UCSF Global Health Group was developed 
to detailed comparatively describe, analyse and discuss 
examples of national malaria programmes that are cur-
rently eliminating or have eliminated malaria. Thus, 
the case studies series offered an opportunity to review 
programme management strategies and contexts across 
countries to identify success factors along the road to 
elimination. In this paper, the authors report the findings 
of this cross case-study analysis, which is the first of its 
kind to examine countries in different socio-economic, 
political and ecological contexts. This analysis focuses 
on the way in which countries have implemented elimi-
nation programmes, have developed and adapted their 
malaria elimination strategies, and how they have oper-
ated within the context of different political, financial and 
human resources.
Methods
This cross case-study review included nine of the 11 case-
studies in the malaria elimination case-study series, pro-
duced through a collaboration between the WHO Global 
Keywords: Malaria elimination, Program management, Case-study
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Malaria Programme and the Global Health Group, Uni-
versity of California San Francisco. Case-studies were 
included in the cross case analysis if they were in final 
English language draft at the time of analysis (November 
2014). Case-studies included in this cross case analysis 
are Bhutan [6], Cape Verde [7], Malaysia [8], Mauritius 
[9], Namibia [10], Philippines [11], Sri Lanka [12], Turkey 
[13], and Turkmenistan [14]. Case studies from La Reun-
ion and Tunisia were not included in this review because 
the report from La Reunion was not finalized nor trans-
lated into English at the time of analysis, and a draft of 
Tunisia was not yet available by the time the analysis was 
underway. Three of the nine case-studies represented 
countries in the prevention of reintroduction phase 
(Table 1), which have reached zero locally acquired cases 
and are actively preventing reintroduction of malaria 
[15].
An initial conceptual framework for programme man-
agement in malaria elimination was developed to pro-
vide structure for the cross case analysis (Additional 
file 1). This framework was based on a document review 
of malaria elimination guidelines, reports, consultations 
and manuals to identify historical and current policy and 
research on management strategies, tools, and opera-
tional research. The document review took place in 2013 
and 2014. The documents reviewed for the development 
of the initial conceptual framework were found using 
the following search terms: “program management,” 
“supervision,” “decentralization,” “vertical,” “integra-
tion,” “health systems,” “incentives,” “training,” “financ-
ing,” “costs,” “human resources” and “malaria,” “malaria 
control,” “malaria elimination” in Pubmed and Google 
Scholar (English only). A list of these documents can be 
found in Additional file 2. The framework was formatted 
in Excel as a matrix (Additional file 1). Using the frame-
work components, two researchers (CSG, GN), reviewed 
each case study report for information (e.g., examples, 
synthesis or analysis) on program experience for each 
concept. If there were examples for a given concept, the 
experience was summarized in detail in the correspond-
ing matrix cell. If there were no examples, the cell was left 
blank. After reviewing a given report across all concepts, 
a summary of the experience with a note as to how strong 
of an example it was (by subjective assessment) was writ-
ten into the cell. After all of the reports were reviewed 
and cells filled in, main challenges and weaknesses of 
each programme experience were summarized by the 
researchers.
A two-day workshop was held in 2014 to review the 
matrices on programme management and other themes. 
Malaria elimination researchers and experts con-
ducted an in-depth review of case-study reports. Each 
reviewer read two reports and compared the information 
presented in the reports against the qualitative descrip-
tions of experience, synthesis and analysis entered into 
the programme management matrix and summaries 
by CSG and GN to ensure that the data captured in the 
matrix were comprehensive, and to debate the lessons 
learned across the case-study experience. One of the 
results of the workshop was consensus that the frame-
work needed revision to better capture the available 
data and draw firmer conclusions of major programme 
strengths and weaknesses. CSG combined the inputs 
from the workshop and additional documents collected 
(see Additional file 2) and re-reviewed to develop the new 
framework. The final conceptual framework for the anal-
ysis can be seen in Fig. 1. The framework was structured 
as follows: (1) Implementation-how malaria elimina-
tion is made to happen; (2) Malaria programme choices 
and changes; (3) Enabling factors, and how these factors 
affect the consistency of implementation. Using this new 
framework, CSG conducted a second round of in-depth 
review of the nine case-study reports, data extraction, 
summary and analysis. Ministry of Health, malaria pro-
gramme personnel or other stakeholders were not inter-
viewed for this analysis; however, data collection for the 
original case-study reports was based on extensive key 




The ways in which malaria programmes were imple-
mented were defined by several factors, including the 
level of decentralization and integration of the malaria 
programme, the health system in which the malaria pro-
gramme operated its organizational structure and the 
accountability of the programme.
Decentralization is defined as the transfer of author-
ity or dispersal of power and responsibility in public 
planning, management and decision making from the 
national level to subnational levels [16]. Most general 
public health programmes operated within a centralized 
structure until the early 1980s, when budget crises and 
recognition of inefficiencies led to widespread reforms 
[17].
Most of the malaria programmes in the case-studies 
operated within an integrated national health system. 
Integrated, or horizontal, programme service delivery 
is the delivery of services through the system of general 
health services [18, 19]. Vertical programmes, in contrast, 
are “directed, supervised and executed, either wholly or 
to a great extent by a specialized service using dedicated 
health workers”, an example of which is national smallpox 
eradication campaigns [18]. Most malaria programmes 
were integrated into curative health services provided 
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by the national government, whereby malaria cases were 
diagnosed and treated in the national network of pri-
mary health care facilities. However the management 
and operations of the other malaria programme activities 
were often less clear. Some programme elements, such as 
surveillance and response approaches or prevention strat-
egies through vector control, were conducted in a semi-
vertical fashion by sub-national malaria-only units run by 
malaria regional officers or malaria technicians in basic 
health units. In other countries, integration with other 
vector-borne diseases translated to sub-national offices 
that coordinated vector control for all vector-borne dis-
eases, using the same funding and personnel to conduct 
vector control for dengue, malaria and other diseases. 
Refer to Table 2 for a summary of the key learnings from 
implementation of malaria elimination programmes.
Table  3 shows the type of organization and level of 
integration of disease control within each country with 
estimated time frame of when these processes were 
underway. Table  3 also includes a measure of the clarity 
of accountability within each malaria programme, which 
was an assessment based on the information in the case-
studies on the responsibility for progress or impact, deci-
sion-making, and funding flow structure of each malaria 
programme.
In addition to the role of integration, decentralization 
and accountability, implementation was also impacted by 
the motivation package for malaria workers, structure of 
incentives, training programmes, and supervisory struc-
ture offered by malaria control programmes. The role 
of intersectoral collaboration and its impact on malaria 
elimination was further explored.
Impact of decentralization on malaria programmes
Overall there were numerous examples of the decentrali-
zation process creating challenges for the implementation 
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Fig. 1 Final conceptual framework
Table 2 Key learnings from implementation of malaria elimination programmes
• Most programmes operated in a decentralized health system, which in some cases led to greater engagement in malaria elimination by subnational 
health offices and communities
• Most programmes were integrated, where malaria programme services were delivered through the system of general health services. Integration 
was overall a negative experience for most malaria programmes because staff were often given too many roles and responsibilities that were not 
clearly defined
• During the early period of transition to decentralized and/or integrated programs, challenges were faced in maintaining quality and execution of 
interventions
• Accountability for programme impact was not clear for most programmes
• Motivation is important to maintain quality of interventions and different groups are and can be incentivized in different ways
• Sustained capacity building and strong supervision are key to successful elimination
• Working with other sectors to share information and develop and implement interventions has led to greater effectiveness in surveillance, preven-
tion and targeting
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and quality of malaria control, with possible contribution 
to increases in incidence during the transition period 
when decentralization was first implemented. However, 
once in place, and roles and responsibilities were clearly 
assigned, in most cases decentralization increased local 
level capacity of the malaria programme as well as com-
munity access to health services. Across the case-studies, 
vertical programmes operating in a centralized health 
system (such as Turkey and Turkmenistan) appeared to 
have the clearest lines of accountability and assignment of 
roles and responsibilities, as there was one level respon-
sible for both elimination strategy development and 
outcome measurement. However, in more complicated 
settings, some case-studies clarified well which office or 
person was ultimately accountable for programme opera-
tions and impact (Table 3). In Malaysia, decentralization 
was seen as benefiting elimination. While the malaria 
programme at the national level developed policy, pro-
vided technical expertise, and controlled the finances, 
each state and district had a vector-borne disease pro-
gramme office which managed, coordinated and imple-
mented malaria activities. The programme engaged state 
offices in the elimination planning by holding elimina-
tion workshops. Additionally, the malaria programme 
believed that the development of sub-sector offices, or 
malaria offices in remote localities in Sabah State had a 
substantial impact on reducing malaria morbidity by 
facilitating integration of the malaria programme into 
communities. Through engagement with the local level, 
there was a greater level of accountability sub-nationally 
for implementation of the malaria programme and its 
impact on the ground. However, funding and decision-
making appeared to mainly rest with the national level.
In contrast, decentralization in Cape Verde appeared 
to impede malaria programme progress, mainly because 
capacity was low at the health delegation (local health 
authority) level and there were few resources or capacity 
for the central malaria programme to supervise or imple-
ment activities in the peripheral areas. Accountability for 
the quality and impact of programme activities was not 
clear.
Decentralization led to both positive and negative out-
comes for the malaria programmes. In the Philippines, 
the process of decentralization led to a seemingly cha-
otic malaria programme environment in the 1980s and 
1990s. At certain points, provincial and municipal level 
authorities were not able to lead malaria control efforts 
because of insufficient training and resources. There was 
a high degree of variation across provinces in quality and 
extent of implementation, NGO involvement, and exter-
nal funding. In Laguna Province, for example, devolution 
in malaria free areas disrupted progress as malaria per-
sonnel were reassigned to other activities. This led to a 
disruption of the surveillance-response system and cre-
ated a vacuum of experience when an outbreak occurred, 
which then threatened to spread into other receptive, 
malaria-free provinces where capacity was also inade-
quate. However, the positive impacts of decentralization 
included an increase in provincial, municipal and com-
munity ownership of malaria, eventual growth in staff 
and skills based in the field and a tailored approach to 
malaria control and elimination. Department of Health 
(national level) staff were positioned in each province 
to supervise and monitor activities, but they were not 
given decision-making authority. Local, sub-national staff 
appreciated this autonomy and turned to higher levels 
only when in need of technical guidance.
Bhutan’s decentralization process was also relatively 
disorganized in the early years, when districts began 
managing the delivery of basic services. Malaria inci-
dence rose from 5213 cases in 1983 to 18,368 in 1984. 
The increase in cases was believed to be the result of a 
decline in indoor residual spraying (IRS) coverage and 
quality. However, once the process was more estab-
lished, decentralization may have contributed to longer 
term reductions in malaria cases through an expansion 
of facilities and deployment of malaria workers in health 
centers in endemic areas, boosting surveillance activities.
In Sri Lanka, decentralization may have also contrib-
uted to an initial rise in malaria-related incidence and 
deaths. From 1990–99, when the system was undergo-
ing the transformation, confirmed infections rose from 
142,294 (1995) to 264,549 (1999). Then, from 2000 
onward, incidence declined. The national programme 
formulated malaria control policy, monitored national 
malaria trends, provided technical guidance, and under-
took entomological and parasitological surveillance. 
District-level offices coordinated parasitological and 
entomological surveillance, vector control, and con-
ducted supervision and M&E activities. Even with the 
initial challenges, decentralization may have contributed 
to stronger leadership at the district level and local adap-
tion of the programme. Accountability mainly rested 
with the national office; however, district malaria officers 
were also held accountable to the national programme.
Turkey’s centralized health system may have contrib-
uted to the consistent approach of the public health ser-
vices, and the maintenance of skills, capacity and malaria 
control activities over time. Challenges included staff 
shortages for active case detection in certain parts of the 
country. Staff were often transferred from areas where 
transmission had been interrupted to areas with current 
transmission, leaving malaria-free areas vulnerable in the 
event of resurgence.
Turkmenistan’s centralized health system may have also 
led to a greater degree of consistency in the programme, 
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accountability at the national level, and political sup-
port. However there were challenges in the programme, 
including delays in diagnosis, treatment and reporting in 
rural areas.
In Namibia, the national malaria programme provided 
funding, trainings and commodities to the regional level, 
which coordinated district activities. Due to the fact that 
donor funding for malaria almost exclusively moved 
through the national programme, accountability rested 
mainly at the national level.
The Mauritius case-study described its malaria pro-
gramme as semi-vertical and the bulk of malaria per-
sonnel sat in the national office. Accountability for 
programme implementation and impact rested mainly at 
the national level.
Impact of integration on elimination progress
The impact of integration on malaria control efforts 
was overall considered negative, mainly due to over-
burdening staff with often-undefined roles and respon-
sibilities. There was also a risk that the integrated 
programme would dedicate fewer resources to malaria 
when cases were reduced. The potential positive outcome 
of increased programme efficiencies and cost savings 
through integration (e.g., with all vector-borne diseases) 
was not documented in the case-studies.
Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Cape Verde provided clear 
examples of malaria programme integration with the 
transition from single-disease to multi-purpose techni-
cians. In Bhutan and Sri Lanka the impact of integration 
was just occurring at the time of data collection and its 
impact was not described. Before integration, malaria 
technicians in Bhutan posted in hospitals and basic 
health units were responsible for all malaria diagnosis, 
treatment, and parasitological and entomological surveil-
lance and vector control. Sub-national Health Delegates 
in Cape Verde became overloaded as they were respon-
sible for clinical and administrative duties in addition to 
supervising the team of health technicians responsible 
for coordinating interventions and surveillance.
In Mauritius, the immediate integration of malaria con-
trol into the general public health services once the last 
indigenous case was detected in 1968 was likely a con-
tributing factor in the resurgence of cases in the 1970s. 
Medical officers were newly responsible for malaria in 
their districts. These rapid transitions contributed to 
poorer quality passive case detection, lack of participa-
tion by health workers in malaria screening programmes, 
and financial constraints after integration.
In Namibia, integration similarly presented logistical 
and bureaucratic hurdles: one example was that drivers 
were not available for malaria related activities because 
they were busy with other Ministry-related tasks.
Malaysia’s integration of the malaria programme 
occurred after 1981, when elimination was declared 
infeasible. The malaria programme was integrated with 
other vector borne diseases at the central and state-
based offices. Since dengue was the most common notifi-
able disease in 2010, it is likely that integration diverted 
resources away from malaria programme activities.
Turkey provided a contrasting example of a vertical 
malaria programme. It appeared that the programme’s 
verticality led to a greater level of consistency in pro-
gramme activity and resources, and translated to clear 
accountability at the national level for malaria strat-
egy and achievements. However, during the epidemics 
recorded in the 1970s and 1990s, a contributing factor 
was waning interest in malaria control as the caseload 
became very low. It is theoretically possible that an inte-
grated programme would been more flexible and cost-
effective, able to shift staff or resources as needed across 
programmes.
The Philippines and Turkmenistan reports were not 
specific about the level of integration of the malaria 
programme.
Motivation and incentives
Maintaining a high level of motivation in implementers is 
important to sustain consistency and quality of interven-
tions. Staff motivation is an important aspect of human 
resource capacity, and depends on a number of factors: 
working conditions, financial incentives, correct and 
prompt compensation, management of staff and possibil-
ities for professional advancement [20]. This basic moti-
vation package is often the key to a successful malaria 
programme. As malaria cases decline, different strategies 
must be employed to keep staff committed, and prevent 
turnover and loss of institutional knowledge. Incentives 
may be used if specific and predetermined milestones are 
achieved. Incentives are the “rewards and punishments 
that [service] providers face as a consequence of the 
organizations in which they work, the institution under 
which they operate and the specific interventions they 
provide” [20]. Community level and political motivation 
is also a key predictor of malaria elimination success, 
and can be significantly enhanced by including elimina-
tion targets and legislation. The case-studies described 
structures and mandates that motivated and incentiv-
ized communities or other sectors to engage in malaria 
elimination. Professional incentives were in place for vol-
unteer health workers, but not described for malaria pro-
gramme workers.
In Sabah State of Malaysia, Primary Health Care Vol-
unteers (PHCV) were motivated by the prospect of 
professional work. PHCVs played an important role in 
diagnosis, treatment and prevention. IRS spraymen were 
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often recruited from the PHCV pool, offering the possi-
bility of a future paid position. Similar to the Sabah pro-
gramme, the Philippines used incentives for the work of 
the paid Barangay (i.e., village) Health Workers. In addi-
tion to earning a small wage and an important role in the 
community, their microscopy skills and responsibilities 
were highly regarded among the primarily uneducated 
women who participated in the programme, who other-
wise had limited employment opportunities.
The structure of external grant funding in the Philip-
pines inadvertently led to a shift in non-financial as well as 
financial motivation in municipal staff. When the Global 
Fund grant support began in Apayao Province, the grant 
was structured such that municipality offices were given 
responsibility for planning and management, which trans-
lated to an increased level of motivation of municipal staff 
to take initiative and ownership of malaria control, with 
the positive affect of an increase in level of confidence for 
managing the malaria programme activities.
External grant funding increased the level of motiva-
tion to conduct comprehensive field work in Sri Lanka, 
because that funding covered travel costs and per diems 
for intensive entomological surveillance and supervision. 
However, delays in payment for the overtime or traveling 
claims counteracted the potential beneficial impact of 
these incentives.
The Sabah State malaria programme’s collaboration 
with private sector plantations (e.g., palm oil planta-
tions) showed the motivating factors for plantations to get 
involved in malaria control. Plantation owners provided 
malaria diagnosis and treatment and some also provided 
vector control (either directly or through support to the 
district malaria programme office) because they believed 
the benefits of the collaboration to be an increase in plan-
tation worker productivity and reduction in worker health 
care costs, an increase in their profile as a good place to 
work by providing access to health care and prevention on 
site, and abiding by expectations in Malaysia for corporate 
social responsibility and adherence to the labour laws.
Mauritius programme staff considered their public 
health laws enforcing environmental management and 
access to homes to conduct vector control to be motivat-
ing factors for community acceptance and participation 
in the malaria programme’s vector control activities.
Certification schemes kept motivation at higher lev-
els in Turkmenistan and the Philippines. Turkmenistan 
created a certification for laboratory quality, for which 
every laboratory participated in a scoring system for 
diagnosis, and labs exceeding an 80  % score received a 
1-year certification. One example of an overarching elim-
ination-friendly structure is the Philippines subnational 
elimination certification process, where provinces were 
reviewed and validated as “malaria free.” This structure 
was thought to have motivated provincial staff and com-
munity participation in malaria control.
Bhutan and Cape Verde did not report on incentives. 
Namibia’s programme found difficulty in recruiting sup-
port to and engagement of communities because their 
health volunteers were not motivated through financial 
or professional incentives.
Training
Training is an important component of a malaria elimina-
tion and POR programme. While there was very limited 
information in the case-studies on the coverage and con-
sistency of trainings, several country experiences showed 
the risk of weakening the malaria programme when 
training programmes became infrequent or inadequate. 
Conversely, programme activities were strengthened 
when training was increased with the injection of exter-
nal funding or if an outbreak occurred. The content and 
format of trainings were not well described and appeared 
to be weakly structured in the case-studies, and there 
was very little information on surveillance and response 
training. Most programmes did not describe on-the-job 
training formats, so it is assumed that they were large, 
seminar-style trainings.
There were several countries with inadequate train-
ing programmes and resultant operational challenges. 
Because training in Namibia was insufficient, quality of 
diagnosis and treatment services, record keeping, coordi-
nation, time management and communication were sub-
optimal. These problems were exacerbated by poor job 
descriptions. In the Philippines, lack of training and fol-
low up when a new drug policy was rolled out meant that 
some staff were unaware of the new policy and how to 
implement it. Inadequate surveillance training in Turk-
menistan weakened the programme in the 1990s and 
contributed to the outbreak of 1998–99. The problem 
was exacerbated by understaffing, in that many Russian 
specialists left the country after independence in 1991. 
Post outbreak, the programme increased capacity with 
the development of a continuous education programme 
(2004–10), reaching more than 1400 personnel. In 2010, 
11–20 % of the government malaria budget was spent on 
staff training.
Global Fund grants provided funds to increase the 
number of trainings in Bhutan, Philippines and Sri Lanka. 
Sri Lanka held regular trainings to maintain engagement 
in elimination. Philippines’ trainings led to improvements 
in planning and delivery of interventions.
Bhutan, Cape Verde, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Turkey 
prioritized microscopy training to ensure that diagnosis 
skills were maintained as malaria cases declined.
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Supervisory structure
Supervision of malaria control activities is conducted 
to ensure the quality of interventions and to increase or 
maintain a high level of motivation in the workforce [21]. 
Effective supervision should include regular visits to the 
periphery and activities to check information and sup-
plies, problem-solving with the employee, and a feedback 
mechanism to encourage improvement [21]. In the case-
study reports, supervision of intervention quality, timing, 
coverage and measurement of impact were not described. 
Resource constraints in some programmes limited staff 
time and transportation to carry out supervision of field 
activities.
In some case-studies the planned (though not neces-
sarily executed) supervision structure was reported. In 
Bhutan, the malaria technicians supervised village health 
workers and health centers. The Sanitary Epidemiologi-
cal Service (SES) of Turkmenistan, which was overseen 
by the Deputy Minister of Health, monitored coverage 
and performance of all interventions. In both Bhutan and 
Turkmenistan, the quality assurance process and supervi-
sion of microscopy were highlighted as key activities.
In the Philippines, Department of Health representa-
tives at the provincial level were reluctant to supervise 
as the local staff worked autonomously. Thus, provin-
cial authorities viewed health workers and local staff as 
partners and supervision in the traditional sense did not 
occur.
The Namibia and Sri Lanka programmes provided 
timeframes for supervision. In Namibia, national staff 
planned to conduct annual regional supervisory visits, 
regional staff conducted quarterly district visits, and dis-
trict staff visited clinics on a monthly basis. Sri Lanka’s 
Regional Malaria Officers aimed to visit all district ento-
mological surveillance, IRS programmes, and up to two 
active case detection activities each month.
In Sabah State of Malaysia, state and district level 
entomologists supervised insecticide treated net (ITN) 
and IRS programmes conducted by district and sub-
district offices. The national level laboratory supervised 
all microscopists and provided retraining for those who 
committed frequent mistakes. District level malaria offic-
ers supervised health volunteers.
In Mauritius, IRS activities by public health staff were 
“strictly” supervised by the team. IRS was conducted for 
2 years within 500 m of a case’s residence.
In some countries, resources were not sufficient 
to maintain adequate supervision. Lack of transpor-
tation and limited staff in Sri Lanka cut down the 
amount of field supervision in recent years. There 
was little funding or time available for Cape Verde’s 
17 Health Delegates to supervise the network of pri-
mary health facilities and health technician teams. In 
Namibia, a supervisory structure existed but was not 
followed due to time constraints and unreliable trans-
portation. In Sri Lanka and Namibia, the injection of 
Global Fund grant funding increased the resources for 
supervision.
Multisectoral collaboration
The case-studies provided examples of multisectoral 
collaboration, where malaria programmes worked or 
planned to collaborate either with other Ministries in 
the government, such as the Ministry of Labour or For-
eign Affairs, or other, non-health sectors including pri-
vate sector health facilities or extractive industries. This 
type of approach is different from programme integra-
tion with national curative or preventive services, but can 
work well within that structure. Resurgences in several 
countries may have been prevented by identifying risks, 
sharing information and collaborating on malaria edu-
cation and control with other ministries and the private 
sector. Contracting out services to private entities, which 
was done by some countries, may be cost-effective and 
increase quality and coverage. There were no experiences 
documented of programmes working with small enter-
prises or local chambers of commerce.
The Bhutan malaria programme reported a need to 
involve other Ministries because of economic develop-
ment activities and related migrant labour entering the 
country. Cape Verde developed collaborations with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Environment, to improve 
agricultural practices and the management of rural water 
sources.
Some programmes outsourced malaria control imple-
mentation to NGOs. Namibia and Angola launched the 
Trans-Kunene Malaria Initiative (TKMI) in 2009 to mon-
itor cross-border importation and coordinate commu-
nication, activities and policies. An NGO provided the 
funding and support for long-lasting insecticide-treated 
net (LLIN) distribution and monitoring along the border 
area. An NGO in the Philippines became the Principal 
Recipient of the Global Fund grant in funded provinces. 
In Sri Lanka, LLIN distribution in the conflict-affected 
areas of the country relied upon local NGOs, as they 
had community based ties to the region and were able to 
operate in areas that presented major challenges for the 
malaria programme.
Several case-studies presented examples of collabo-
rations with private sector plantations or construction 
companies. During its first elimination campaign, Mau-
ritius collaborated with private sugar companies to edu-
cate employees about malaria prevention and to create 
private clinics for screening and case reporting. More 
recently, the Sabah State malaria programme in Malay-
sia developed informal partnerships with private sector 
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plantations. Plantation owners contributed resources 
by building subsector offices or clinics for malaria pro-
gramme workers and contracting out or conducting IRS 
for plantation structures. Leaders of Apayao Province in 
the Philippines worked with local mine and mill opera-
tors and dam construction companies to identify pro-
jects that would increase the flow of migrant labour in 
high malaria risk areas and to develop joint screening and 
reporting systems. In Turkey, the malaria programme 
monitored irrigation systems.
Turkmenistan had a similar challenge, where there was 
an increase in vulnerability to malaria transmission due 
to military training activities and migrant worker mobil-
ity, both of which contributed to the outbreaks of malaria 
in 1998–99 and 2002–2003. Vulnerability is the proxim-
ity to malarious areas or resulting from the frequent influx 
of infected individuals or groups or infective anophelines 
[15]. In response, in 2005, the Chairman of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Turkmenistan approved several documents 
calling for intersectoral collaboration and implemented 
plans including collaborating with the Ministry of Defense 
to share information, immigration services, and construc-
tion and oil companies that import labor to provide health 
information, free access to diagnosis and treatment.
Malaria programme choices and changes
Most case-studies documented the development of stra-
tegic plans and strategies for targeting interventions. 
Some programmes showed a high degree of flexibility and 
forward thinking. Surges in action by programmes were 
often reactionary and not a result of robust planning, and 
there were gaps in many programmes in monitoring and 
evaluation, particularly in the provision of feedback to 
the lower levels of the health system. Table 4 provides key 
learnings for programme choices and changes.
Strategic plans
The case-study reports had limited information on pro-
gramme strategies and activities, and how they were 
designed. Five case-studies reported on the national stra-
tegic plan objectives and planned interventions (Bhutan, 
Cape Verde, Philippines, Turkey and Turkmenistan). It 
is assumed that all countries had strategic plans for con-
trol and elimination, but these plans were not described 
in the case-study. Most reports did not indicate whether 
the specific strategies were followed, or whether there 
was 100 % compliance in coverage and timing. This is dis-
cussed in the M&E section.
Stratification
Stratification plans assist malaria programmes in tar-
geting interventions and managing threats of increased 
receptivity or vulnerability. Receptivity means there is 
presence of anopheline vectors and existence of other 
factors favoring malaria transmission [15], while vulner-
ability describes the risk of malaria importation. Strati-
fication plans may be based on disease epidemiology, 
entomological data, and socio-economic and develop-
ment factors, such as development projects or population 
movement. Five case-studies included a recent stratifica-
tion system (Table 5). Although the spatial scale and cat-
egories used in the stratification systems varied greatly, 
these systems identified priority areas for programmes 
to dedicate resources and response activities. Overall, a 
major gap in stratification plans across the case-studies 
was the surveillance and response strategies developed to 
mitigate the threat of vulnerability.
The spatial scale used in the stratification systems var-
ied across the countries. Some countries used the WHO 
foci classification system, which is currently comprised 
of seven categories of transmission foci (new potential, 
new active, endemic, residual active, residual non-active, 
cleared up, pseudo focus) [15]. The POR countries of 
Mauritius, Turkey, and Turkmenistan reported using 
the foci system. Bhutan used a district-level stratifica-
tion system, but in 2012 adapted the foci-based system 
using six categories (endemic, residual active, residual 
non-active, new active, new potential, cleared-up). Mau-
ritius used three categories (active residual foci; active 
new foci with more than three cases; active new foci with 
less than three cases). Other countries employed differ-
ent spatial or descriptive scales. “Localities” in Malay-
sia were described as a village, section of plantation or 
housing area. Other countries used district or regional 
administrative units. In the Philippines, the unit of 
administration was the province, but the category of risk 
was defined at the barangay (village) level and aggregated 
up to the province level.
Only the Malaysia and Turkmenistan reports described 
how the programmes developed their stratification 
Table 4 Key learnings from malaria elimination choices and changes
• Strategic plans and stratification strategies are an important part of programme planning
• In most cases, programme action occurred as a result of an increase in malaria cases or deaths. In a few cases, a new elimination goal or leadership 
drove action
• Some programmes showed a high degree of flexibility and adoption of new strategies and tools
• Programmes likely avoided outbreaks by working with other sectors to identify and respond to threats of importation or increased incidence
• Analysis and feedback of programme performance to the periphery is important but not well-described in the case-studies
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system. Malaysia reviewed incidence over 3 years, vector 
receptivity, and access to the health system. Turkmeni-
stan reviewed case investigation and surveillance data 
combined with the malaria foci record “passports”, which 
included mapping. Programmes updated their stratifica-
tion systems from every 3 years up to every 30 years or 
more.
The stratification strategies in Mauritius, Philippines 
and Turkey outlined response activities to be applied in 
each strata. The malaria programmes with clear strati-
fication criteria, indicators and vector control targets 
appeared to benefit from these systems. Stratification 
was viewed as extremely helpful by the Philippines pro-
gramme and in Turkey was believed to have facilitated 
appropriate decision making for the application of vector 
control. Namibia’s stratification system allowed for tar-
geting of resources to priority areas; however the risk of 
importation and onward transmission in some areas was 
likely underrepresented. In Sri Lanka, epidemic forecast-
ing based on entomological surveillance identified areas 
for mobile surveillance clinics and focal IRS.
Programme action
Some malaria programmes were spurred to action in 
response to increasing transmission, an outbreak or an 
increase in mortality. In most cases, these events were 
caused by waning surveillance or control, precipitated 
by a weakening of the surveillance and response system, 
which subsequently required a ramp up of resources and 
programme intervention. In other cases, surges in action 
were the result of leadership at the national or subna-
tional level.
In several countries, a gradual decline in programme 
efforts led to outbreaks, which in turn encouraged pro-
grammatic action. Turkey did not plan for potentially 
increasing transmission when major irrigation projects 
were underway and increases in migration were expected. 
These factors contributed to an outbreak in 1977. In 
response, the programme was given a larger allocation 
by the government, surveillance agents and microsco-
pists were hired, and laboratories received more funding. 
Turkmenistan saw an increasing level of vulnerability to 
malaria importation along the border with Afghanistan, 
and this risk was compounded by delays in diagnosis, 
treatment and reporting of malaria cases in some rural 
areas. These factors led to an outbreak in 1998–99, the 
response for which was an immediate increase in con-
sumables for diagnosis and chloroquine and primaquine 
for radical treatment and chemoprophylaxis. A reduc-
tion in transmission followed. In Cape Verde, multi-
ple outbreaks have occurred after IRS was reduced or 
halted; each outbreak triggered a surge in IRS coverage. 
The efforts, though, were not maintained as evidenced by 
the locally acquired cases recorded nearly every year. In 
2006, an increase in mortality to eight deaths led to an 
investigation by the Cape Verde Ministry of Health and 
development of a new national goal of malaria elimina-
tion by 2020. In Malaysia, outbreaks in plantation areas 
of Sabah State stimulated several inter-sectoral private–
public partnerships with plantations which included sur-
veillance and vector control activities.
In several countries, endorsement of an elimination 
goal by government leaders led to programme action. 
When malaria elimination was adopted in the 1940s and 
re-adopted after its resurgence in 1975, the Government 
of Mauritius organized a military-like offensive. Philip-
pines provided a similar example, but in a highly decen-
tralized context, where in certain provinces motivated 
leaders augmented malaria screening and other control 
efforts by increasing staff and funding for the activities. 
In Namibia, action was spurred by the leadership of the 
former Minister of Health.
In some countries, programme activities continued 
consistently, without such surges in action. After expe-
riencing resurgence in the 1970s, Sri Lanka maintained 
entomological and parasitological surveillance activities, 
which informed programme activities and response strat-
egies. Bhutan also had relatively consistent programme 
implementation.
Flexibility of malaria programme strategies and approaches 
to problem‑solving
Several countries showed a high level of flexibility by 
introducing new or adapting strategies, from insecticide 
rotation to lessen the risk of insecticide resistance, to 
an increase in parasitological screening in development 
areas to curtail the risk of transmission, to collaborations 
with the private sector. The case-studies did not have 
detailed information on the process undertaken to evalu-
ate or adapt new strategies.
Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Malaysia showed evidence of 
flexible programming. Sri Lanka introduced a series of 
programme changes in the 1990s, including the intro-
duction of targeted IRS to replace “blanket”, or universal, 
spraying, partly in response to new WHO recommen-
dations [22]. IRS insecticide rotation was introduced in 
1998, for which different types of insecticides were used 
in bordering districts with rotation of insecticides across 
districts over time in order to lessen the risk of resist-
ance. Farmer Field Schools were developed in the late 
2000s, building awareness about the connection between 
insecticide use for agriculture and for disease manage-
ment. Then, between 2000 and 2011, primaquine for 
radical cure of Plasmodium falciparum infections and 
RDTs for mobile malaria clinics were rolled out. In 2009, 
as the country progressed toward elimination, a series 
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of changes to its parasitological surveillance programme 
were introduced. Bhutan similarly instituted a series of 
surveillance and response activities, including parasi-
tological surveillance, mapping and response measures 
starting in 2013.
The malaria programme of Sabah State of Malaysia 
also showed flexibility. In the mid-1990s, Sabah State 
responded to the need at the community level for better 
access to diagnosis and treatment by recruiting and train-
ing primary health care volunteers. In 1995, volunteers 
collected 14 % of the blood slides taken in the state.
Adoption of an elimination goal spurred the design and 
scale up of surveillance activities and integrated vector 
management (IVM) in Turkey, to be used in active foci 
and in emergency situations. The Ministry of Health sup-
ported these new strategies through decrees, regulations 
and guidelines.
Turkmenistan showed adaptive capacity in its response 
to two outbreaks that occurred post-elimination. A suite 
of epidemiological, treatment and entomological surveil-
lance interventions and policies were rapidly executed 
in response to the 1998–1999 outbreak, along with 
monitoring and supervision by the national programme. 
However another outbreak occurred within 3  years 
(2002–2003), meaning that these measures were likely 
not sustained. The outbreak of 2002–2003 led to a similar 
scale up of interventions and surveillance, and also led to 
sweeping changes to strengthen the whole malaria con-
trol system starting in 2004.
The programme in Mauritius appeared to stay consist-
ent over time. During the period of resurgence, the pro-
gramme showed flexibility in that it was able to mobilize 
a large number of staff. The Cape Verde and Namibia 
case-studies did not contain specific examples of flexibil-
ity in the malaria programme.
Programme capacity for forward thinking
Malaria programmes in the case-study series did not 
show a high level of capacity for anticipation of threats to 
elimination. There are many examples of major develop-
ment projections that combined a potential for increased 
receptivity and vulnerability. In general programmes 
either did not identify these challenges in advance there-
fore did not have adequate or timely responses to these 
threats, or they were unable to secure funding to miti-
gate the impact. In either case, there appeared to be a 
lack of coordination with other sectors. In the few exam-
ples where programmes did work with other sectors, it 
appeared to help avoid outbreaks or epidemics.
Several malaria programmes did not anticipate the 
increased risk of malaria transmission posed by irri-
gation and reservoir projects. In Sri Lanka, dam con-
struction and forest clearing for rice cultivation in the 
malaria-endemic eastern part of the country likely 
increased receptivity and led to the epidemic of 1987. 
There was no documented action by the malaria pro-
gramme, nor was there evidence in the case-study that 
resources were increased, to offset these risks, and the 
epidemic grew to 687,599 cases by 1987. Reservoir con-
struction in the 1980s and 1990s in Turkmenistan also 
led to increases in receptivity as the filtration ponds 
increased anopheline breeding habitat. At the same time 
(1980s), the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) increased population movement into 
the country from Afghanistan, where malaria endemicity 
was higher. These developments contributed to the out-
breaks in the 1990s.
The epidemic of 1977 in Turkey, which took place only 
3  years after the country reported its last indigenous 
malaria case, was caused in part by an extensive irrigation 
project which increased breeding habitat and the level of 
internal migration from higher transmission areas in the 
eastern part of the country. However, the programme 
did not increase its surveillance efforts and by 1977 there 
were 115,512 recorded Plasmodium vivax cases. A sec-
ond epidemic occurred in 1991, even though the irriga-
tion canals were covered to prevent mosquito breeding. 
The programme did not adequately respond to large-
scale internal migration from remote, endemic rural 
areas into the irrigation project zone, nor account for the 
flow of migrants from neighbouring countries, many of 
which were not politically stable and some of which were 
experiencing P. vivax epidemics. There were an inade-
quate number of malaria personnel in the affected areas 
and it is unclear whether additional resources were made 
available to the programme to stymie the risks. Subse-
quently, there was an increase from less than 15,000 cases 
in 1991 to more than 84,000 by 1994.
When an influx of construction workers entered Mau-
ritius after a major typhoon, a resurgence of malaria 
occurred from zero local (since 1968) to 41 cases in 1975. 
Based on this experience, Mauritius anticipated future 
risk of imported malaria by implementing an extensive 
border screening programme, including follow up visits 
and screening for arriving at-risk groups and detected 
positive cases. Similar to Mauritius, an increase in intra-
national and international movement in Cape Verde 
occurred as a result of improvements in ports and air-
ports. The programme did not anticipate the impact of 
these projects. Bhutan’s malaria programme was rapidly 
moving toward elimination and was keenly aware of the 
high receptivity and vulnerability along the southern 
border with India. In addition, there were an estimated 
35,000 documented workers in the country, the major-
ity of which were employed in large-scale development 
projects in the interior and southern districts. Proactive 
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case detection started in these development zones where 
migrants live and work. The programme also piloted 
Community Action Groups in the southern, receptive 
districts that have larger migrant flows from India. These 
groups enlisted community support in prevention and 
control of malaria.
The number of migrant workers originating from high 
transmission neighbouring countries propelled Malay-
sia’s Sabah State to begin collaborations with private 
sector plantations in the early 2000s to implement and 
surveillance of malaria to anticipate and avoid outbreaks.
The Philippines planned for malaria elimination by 
developing a certification process for subnational elimi-
nation in 2011, believed to be necessary because of the 
geography of the country, which is composed of many 
islands with different malaria potential.
The Namibia case-study did not provide specific exam-
ples of anticipation of threats.
Monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) includes monitoring 
programme outputs, such as whether intervention cover-
age and quality was achieved, and evaluation of impact. 
Most case-studies described evaluation of case data while 
some included vector control or surveillance data. Only 
two programmes emphasized the quality or coverage 
of interventions. An important part of M&E is analysis 
and swift feedback to the periphery, which should theo-
retically stimulate effective programme response, clearly 
M&E needs to be undertaken with a spirit of surveillance 
and response.
Only two case-studies highlighted the results of moni-
toring and showed that the programme did not achieve 
the coverage or quality targets. No case-studies included 
information on M&E of inputs and outputs. The Malaysia 
case-study gave the most comprehensive results of inter-
vention monitoring, showing the difficulty in achieving 
coverage and timeliness of case investigation, diagnosis, 
vector control, and the intensive passenger screening 
programme.
For other countries, case reporting appeared to be the 
main tool for evaluation. Bhutan checked weekly case 
reports from the health facilities. The malaria programme 
followed up with health facilities for missing or incom-
plete reports, and if an increase in cases was reported, 
the respective health center was alerted. Namibia also 
reviewed weekly case reporting. In recent years, roll out 
of better diagnostic tools and coverage improved data 
quality and representation of the malaria burden. In addi-
tion, IRS quality was monitored after quality declined. 
A weakness cited in the Namibia case-study was the 
lack of data and limited feedback to the sub-national 
programmes.
Malaysia developed a web-based surveillance database 
in 2000 for M&E, which facilitated first the reporting of 
malaria cases, then included case investigation and vec-
tor control intervention data which could be monitored. 
Also in 2000, a separate online case notification system 
for health providers was introduced, where private and 
public health facilities rapidly reported all notifiable 
infectious diseases. The malaria programme regularly 
reviewed data from both systems and identified and con-
tacted the hospitals, clinics, and private providers that 
failed to notify cases. The use of two parallel systems 
could have been cumbersome, but the report stated that 
the national and state programme officers used both 
databases to drive management decisions.
The monitoring and evaluation of malaria activities 
in Sri Lanka was coordinated by the Regional Malaria 
Officers (at district level) and by the AMC Directorate 
(national level). Sri Lanka built a web-based case infor-
mation system in 2009, separate from the national health 
information system, to ensure reporting within 24 h. The 
malaria programme planned to integrate the malaria 
reporting system into the national health information 
system after reaching elimination. In 2010, the malaria 
programme introduced a toll free hotline for private 
sector case reporting. In 2009, to increase data analysis, 
review and improve the feedback loop to the sub-national 
programme offices the malaria programme instituted 
case review meetings. These meetings were attended by 
Directorate and regional malaria programme officers, 
where details of each case and follow up measures were 
reviewed, and they provided an opportunity for feedback 
to the regional malaria officers, who then relayed infor-
mation back to the districts. These meetings showed an 
openness to review, evaluation and change by both the 
national and regional levels.
There was a lack of information on the tools and pro-
cesses used in Cape Verde and the Philippines for M&E.
For Turkey and Turkmenistan, resurgences demon-
strated the weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation. 
In Turkmenistan, while transmission decreased when 
funding was available and activities were well-organized, 
delays in diagnosis, treatment and reporting fueled the 
outbreaks of 1998–99 and 2002–03. Case reporting did 
not flow to the central level in time for evaluation. Simi-
larly, in Turkey, the delayed reporting to the provincial 
and national level contributed to the 1998–99 outbreak.
Enabling factors
There are many factors that enable or hinder progress 
towards elimination for a national malaria programme. 
Political commitment, funding, and human resources 
are three key factors that have a large influence on pro-
gramme progress. These factors also determine the 
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consistency of malaria programme implementation. 
Table  6 provides key learnings on enabling factors for 
malaria programmes.
Political commitment
Depending on the country’s level of decentralization and 
its health system structure, political commitment at the 
national or local level was a driving factor for malaria 
programme success. Political commitment took many 
forms, including enacting mandates or laws that sup-
port vector control activities and surveillance, ensuring 
adequate domestic funding and leadership and vision 
for elimination by national or local level leaders. Turk-
menistan provides an example of the deleterious impact 
of waning political commitment when malaria incidence 
declines.
In Mauritius, there was a high degree of political com-
mitment at the national level, evidenced by the con-
sistent domestic financing of the programme. National 
policy was supportive to elimination, contributing to a 
high level of participation by residents in malaria con-
trol activities. There were penalties for non-compliance 
and health inspectors had legal power to inspect dwell-
ings. Similarly in Malaysia, national policies and legisla-
tion were enacted to support elimination; for example, 
the malaria programme could engage in IRS and ITN 
distribution on private property and all foreign workers 
had to undergo screening for malaria before receiving 
a work permit. Sabah and Sarawak States had addi-
tional state-level ordinances to support malaria control 
activities.
Turkey’s first elimination attempt was successful in part 
due to steady political commitment. Turkey experienced 
an epidemic in 1977, then signed the Tashkent Declara-
tion in 2006, which outlined the strategy to achieve elimi-
nation in nine countries of the WHO EURO Region by 
2015. With the Declaration, the malaria programme had 
the necessary political support to transition toward elim-
ination in 2008.
The Bhutan malaria programme also had the support 
of the Ministry of Health—outbreak reports reached the 
President’s office. Namibia’s elimination programme had 
the support of the Minister of Health, who was the for-
mer manager of the malaria programme and an advocate 
for regional elimination. In Cape Verde, an increase in 
malaria mortality (to eight deaths) in 2006 led to a greater 
level of attention of government leaders and the develop-
ment of a new elimination goal of 2020.
National-level political commitment for elimination 
in Turkmenistan waned in the years leading up to the 
outbreak in Mary Province (2002–2003). In response, 
commitment was strengthened from 2004 onwards, 
as evidenced by the government financing dedicated 
to malaria in preparation for the certification process 
in 2010. The country then drew up a comprehensive 
national plan for prevention of reintroduction with sup-
port and commitment from the Ministry of Health and 
Medical Industry, Finance, and intersectoral cooperation.
In other case-studies, commitment at the local level 
was considered to be a driving factor for success. Malay-
sia’s Sabah State developed and presented to the national 
programme a 5  years action plan for malaria control, 
which built the case for an increase in funding, human 
resources and development of subsector outpost offices 
in remote areas, in addition to scaling up of vector con-
trol, surveillance and community-based activities. The 
plan was successful and the state obtained funding from 
the national government for 100 additional positions. As 
a result, the proportion of cases investigated increased 
from 40 to 87 % and malaria offices in remote localities 
were opened to provide microscopy, vector control, mass 
blood surveys, and health education.
Philippines also provided an example of the strength of 
commitment at the local level. Municipalities and com-
munities participated and developed civic duty and pride 
through malaria programme activities, such as environ-
mental clean-up events. The level of commitment and 
malaria experience of provincial managers had a large 
influence on the success of the programme. For example, 
Apayao and Laguna Provinces were highlighted in the 
case-study as having strong, knowledgeable, dedicated, 
well-liked and respected leaders, which drove action and 
success in their provinces.
Sri Lanka’s malaria programme had commitment to 
malaria at both national and local levels. The malaria 
programme and Ministry of Health showed commitment 
through the maintenance of surveillance and vector con-
trol in the conflict zone. Commitment by the Ministry of 
Health continued even with very low malaria cases, evi-
denced by the maintenance of specialized malaria screen-
ing in health facilities and continuation of entomological 
surveillance.
Table 6 Key learnings on enabling factors of malaria elimination programmes
• Political commitment at the regional, national, provincial, district, and community levels took many forms and contributed to programme success
• Sustained and long-term financial commitment to the malaria programme is a key to success
• Consistency of malaria programmes depends on political commitment, human and financial resources, leadership of the malaria programme and 
operational capacity of the overall health system
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Stable and predictable funding and human resources
Strong financial commitment has led to strong malaria 
control programmes. The case-studies showed three 
examples of resurgence primarily due to a reduction 
in human and financial resources for malaria elimina-
tion. Some countries relied purely on domestic financ-
ing, which caused some challenges in the past but overall 
appeared to increase the consistency of the programme 
when compared to countries that rely heavily on donor 
financing. Of interest is the specific question regarding 
how to maintain funding and skills of IRS spraymen and 
other staff on needed response activities when cases are 
very low or reach zero.
Three countries that have successfully eliminated 
malaria today had experienced resurgences after reaching 
or nearly reaching elimination in the past, in most part 
due to declines in funding or human resources. Reduced 
funding in Mauritius contributed to the resurgence in 
the 1970s. Inadequate financial and human resources 
led to Turkey’s 1977 epidemic and again to the 1993–96 
epidemic, where there were insufficient staff and health 
facilities in the area of a major development project, 
and insufficient malaria expertise at the provincial level. 
There was a decrease in staffing in receptive and vulner-
able areas and delays in identification and reporting of 
cases. The lack of human and financial resources in Turk-
menistan contributed to the 1998–99 outbreak as techni-
cal skills and declining staff were lost in the 1990s.
Post-resurgence, these countries built up their pro-
grammes in order to achieve elimination. Mauritius, 
where the government funded the malaria programme, 
spent over US $2 per capita on malaria in the period after 
the resurgence, despite zero indigenous transmission, in 
an effort to minimize the risk of resurgence. Per-capita 
expenditure during the first elimination attempt, before 
this latest resurgence, ranged from $6 to $3. A 100-per-
son surveillance team and 100-person vector control 
team spent nearly 100  % of time on malaria-related 
activities, a relatively large workforce in a context of zero 
indigenous cases. After the epidemic of 1977, Turkey 
increased its allocation to the malaria programme with 
a corresponding increase in the number of surveillance 
agents, laboratories, and microscopists. The country 
found that maintaining skilled personnel was essential 
to achieve elimination and prevent resurgence through 
rapid response to outbreaks.
After the 1998–99 outbreak in Turkmenistan, an ini-
tiative to build up the number of epidemiologists, lab 
technicians, and parasitologists began. Then, from 2005 
to 2009, in preparation for the elimination goal, the pro-
gramme doubled the number of malaria staff in parasi-
tology, entomology, and laboratory diagnostics. By 2010, 
as mentioned previously, 11–20  % of the government 
malaria budget was spent on training, an indicator of the 
Ministry’s efforts to maintain quality interventions. The 
2009–10 programme costs were covered mainly by the 
government.
Malaysia has had recent success in maintaining low 
transmission, partly attributable to the strength of the 
health system. Malaysia provided one of the few exam-
ples of a fully domestic-funded malaria programme in the 
elimination phase, which has led to a greater degree of 
consistency in funding and human resources when com-
pared to other, donor-funded programmes.
Bhutan maintained a cadre of malaria technicians, even 
during years of declining malaria incidence. However, 
at the time of case-study publication, during elimina-
tion, these technicians were to be integrated into multi-
purpose health workers. With this transition, there is a 
risk that commitment to malaria could wane. The case-
study also reported on the importance of Global Fund 
grant funding (Rounds 4 and 7) for staff capacity build-
ing, development of community leadership and action, 
and malaria prevention commodities for hard to reach 
populations.
In the Philippines, provincial manager empowerment 
and ownership has increased consistency and increased 
funding by local governments. The case-study also noted 
the importance of Global Fund and other donor funding 
to maintain programme capacity.
Sri Lanka has had an adequate level of funding and 
resources over time, evidenced by consistent activities 
and the maintenance of specialized resources such as 
malaria-only diagnostic centers in health facilities. How-
ever, there was concern noted in the case-study about 
long-term, sustainable funding as the country reached 
its goal of zero malaria cases, in part because of the his-
torical contributing factors to the 1987 epidemic, which 
included a shortage of Regional Malaria Officers. In addi-
tion, full time malaria programme staff decreased by 29 % 
from 2004 to 2009, which reduced the number of public 
health field officers and IRS spraymen who were moved 
to other positions (e.g., clerks in medical institutions, 
drivers, assistants) and to other disease priorities (e.g., 
dengue) and were not easily released to work on malaria. 
These transfers of positions were likely due to the low 
number of cases where administrators did not consider it 
necessary to maintain a malaria control employee.
Cape Verde and Namibia provided examples of incon-
sistent funding and human resources. Cape Verde has 
received funding from the Global Fund and the Gov-
ernment of Spain. However, shortages in trained human 
resources for health and malaria control have continued 
to constrain the programme, evidenced by the single pro-
fessional running the entire malaria programme at the 
national level.
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Similarly, human resources and funding in Namibia 
were not considered adequate, even with the donor fund-
ing. There were vacant positions at every level, which 
led to a reactive rather than a proactive and planned 
approach. Staff turnover translated to an increased 
workload.
Consistency of programme implementation
Consistency of programme implementation over time 
depends on the level of political commitment, human 
and financial resources, and leadership of the malaria 
programme. It also depends on the operational capacity 
of the programme and the overall health system struc-
ture. Comparing the consistency, coverage and quality 
of interventions across the countries in the case-studies 
proved challenging, as these aspects of the programmes 
were not adequately documented. Changes in leadership, 
commitment and funding levels led to decreased consist-
ency in some programmes. In three cases, programmes 
were consistent, leading to major reductions in malaria 
incidence, which precipitated a lower level of commit-
ment and attention to the malaria programme and a low-
ering of quality and coverage of the programme. In these 
cases, resurgence was around the corner, and instigated a 
rise in programme quality and coverage.
Turkey had success in its first elimination attempt in 
part due to the experienced, specialized network that car-
ried out operations. Turkmenistan’s outbreak of 1998–99 
was partly due to a weakening of the surveillance sys-
tem. Post-outbreak, the malaria programme ramped up 
training, surveillance and vector control activities, and 
ensured the supply of malaria control stocks well after 
the outbreak was contained.
Success in maintaining low cases in Malaysia, Bhutan 
and Sri Lanka was partly attributed in the case-studies to 
the strength of the health system and available infrastruc-
ture, including consistent availability of supplies, even in 
the conflict affected districts of Sri Lanka. However, in 
Malaysia, the high turnover of leadership in the disease 
control programme translated to a loss of institutional 
malaria knowledge and may have impacted the quality of 
implementation.
Financial and political support in Mauritius allowed for 
consistency of implementation, even in the POR phase. 
For example, the passenger screening programme was 
maintained, which continued to draw human and finan-
cial resources during a period of zero local transmission.
The Cape Verde and Namibia case-studies did not 
report a consistent level of malaria activity implemen-
tation. Both programmes had inadequate IRS coverage 
and quality at times. Restructuring of the programme 
and health system multiple times in the Philippines led 
to gaps in coverage of interventions, which affected 
programme performance. The case-study emphasized 
the role of the provincial manager in driving programme 
consistency through ownership, initiative and expertise.
Discussion
This paper reviewed nine case-studies examining 
malaria eliminating programmes and found that these 
programmes operated in highly diverse and challeng-
ing ecological, epidemiological, financial, political, and 
organizational contexts. However, despite this diver-
sity, commonalities and learning points were identified 
that can help programme managers, policy makers and 
funders improve the functioning of malaria elimination 
programmes. Malaria programmes that were successful 
in eliminating malaria or greatly reducing malaria inci-
dence had the following characteristics: clear lines of 
accountability and some degree of verticality in the pro-
gramme; sustained political commitment and funding; 
a high degree of flexibility and adaptation to changing 
circumstances and tools; and multi-sector collabora-
tions that facilitated response to threats of outbreak and 
resurgence.
The analysis of case-studies was limited by several 
factors. The original case-studies were based on retro-
spective data collection, and the quality of data varied 
across topics and themes across the case-studies. Data 
collection for the case-studies was broad, covering all 
malaria control strategies and activities and across many 
decades, meaning that detailed information on pro-
gramme management strategies was not available for 
every case-study nor for every year covered in the data 
collection process. Furthermore, each final case-study 
report underwent a major review and editing process, 
which may have introduced errors, deleted concepts or 
changed perspectives. Due to financial and time con-
straints, a second round of in-country visits, key inform-
ant interviews and record review were not conducted 
for this cross-case analysis. Because of these limitations, 
relevant and helpful information or experience from 
national malaria programmes may not be represented in 
this analysis.
The comparative analysis distilled experience on the 
core components of programme management thought 
to be essential to accelerating towards global eradica-
tion. However, the analysis was unable to make specific 
recommendations on what did or did not lead to coun-
try progress towards elimination due to differences in 
the malaria programmes that exist beyond programme 
management. What was possible was to determine how 
malaria programmes handled challenges that were out-
side of their sphere of influence, partially under the influ-
ence of programme, or completely under the influence of 
the programme.
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Malaria programmes faced several obstacles over which 
they had very little control. A major challenge was oper-
ating in a decentralized and integrated health system, 
where, in most cases, provincial or district health offices 
controlled malaria resources and implementation with-
out defined, clear roles and responsibilities. The experi-
ence and knowledge base at the national programme was 
no longer utilized as it was in the past, and oftentimes 
the provincial offices did not have adequate training in 
the beginning of these transitions. Thus the subnational 
systems were not able to develop and implement tailored 
surveillance and response systems that are able to deal 
with the heterogeneity of transmission that occurs in 
elimination settings. In an integrated programme, diag-
nosis and treatment were provided by the general health 
services, generally by those without malaria expertise. 
For countries where decentralization or integration will 
be implemented, evidence suggests that integration must 
be gradual and well-planned. District officers must have 
adequate training and supervision and health workers 
need preparation and motivation to assist with malaria 
control. If possible, malaria programmes should advocate 
for sustaining some elements of verticality, such as mul-
tipurpose malaria-focused workers, to ensure sufficient 
attention to malaria. These positions can support non-
specialists in the general health system and increase the 
quality of services [23].
Stronger malaria programmes have clear accountability 
by identifying who is responsible for achieving elimina-
tion, but this clarity can be challenging in an integrated 
and decentralized context. Experience from other dis-
ease eradication programmes found that designating a 
responsible central unit or an individual ensures leader-
ship and coordination [24, 25]. National and state-level 
elimination plans are also helpful. A multi-sectoral task 
force, at the state or provincial level, ensures engagement 
from ministries and experts from other disciplines [24, 
25]. Lastly, malaria programmes should seek to empower 
and increase authority of local level staff to ensure strong 
engagement and ownership of the malaria programme. 
Building management skills at the lower levels is one way 
to empower staff [26]. Implementing monthly case review 
meetings, convened by the national programme, where 
district level officers work together to interpret outcomes 
and identify lessons to improve daily practice, is a form of 
organizational learning and supportive supervision.
Malaria programmes have a degree of control over 
malaria programme capacity, supervision and motiva-
tion of workers. The productivity of workers and quality 
of services provided are critical to programme perfor-
mance and both rely on staff capacity [26]. In most out-
breaks or resurgences documented in the case-studies, 
contributing factors were inadequate staff, insufficient 
training and low-quality supervision. Experience from 
the malaria and smallpox eradication programmes has 
shown the necessity of adequate personnel that are 
well-trained, supervised, motivated, and capable of 
flexible action, evaluation and problem solving [4, 24]. 
Thus, training programmes must include both techni-
cal and operational components; on-the-job training, 
with emphasis on supervision and coordination [27]. 
Programmes can also consider shifting resources to con-
tinuing education and development, as large investments 
in training are often lost when there is no maintenance 
[26, 27]. Continuing education can also improve reten-
tion by incentivizing and motivating personnel. Supervi-
sion is also critical to programme quality, in particular for 
decentralized and integrated disease programmes and for 
those that depend on high quality surveillance activities 
that are field-based [21, 28]. Good supervision requires 
updated job descriptions with clear descriptions of roles 
and responsibilities [29]. While supervision usually takes 
the form of peripheral visits and checking information 
and supplies, monthly review meetings are another way 
to supervise and also facilitate peer-to-peer learning and 
exchange [24]. Problem solving and feedback, in particu-
lar supportive feedback, are important parts of supervi-
sion and build worker motivation [21].
The case-studies showed that malaria elimination 
workers are a diverse group, including paid and volunteer 
health workers, malaria programme and hospital staff, 
seasonal employees, and multi-sector partners. These 
personnel have different values and are motivated by dif-
ferent factors. For paid staff, a basic motivation package 
should be ensured, including reasonable level and tim-
ing of pay, working environments, potential for learn-
ing career advancement, and system capacities [26, 27]. 
Malaria programmes may be able to lobby their Ministry 
to ensure there is a basic package in place. Malaria pro-
grammes can also build forums for professionals to asso-
ciate and learn from each other, and develop criteria for 
career advancement based on performance [17]. Perhaps 
most important, motivation is high when there is a clear 
goal and endpoint—malaria programmes can clarify their 
strategy and milestones, bringing the team along with 
them [24].
Malaria programmes have control over their efforts to 
improve the level of political commitment and funding, 
programme strategy and collaborations for malaria elimi-
nation. Political commitment at the global and national 
level is needed for elimination, as very well evidenced by 
experience from smallpox and polio eradication [24, 29]. 
Reliable financial commitment is also needed, from both 
domestic and international sources [2, 23]. Throughout 
the case-studies, the declaration of a national or sub-
national elimination goal often sparked and sustained 
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political commitment and increased funding. In some 
cases, regional or global forums catalyzed support for a 
national elimination goal, through building awareness 
and friendly competition amongst countries.
The case-studies did not sufficiently document strategic 
plan development and their adjustments and adaptation, 
stratification and targeting of interventions. Targeting 
requires access to and analysis of real-time information 
with built-in feedback mechanism to the field where 
implementation decisions are made. Smallpox eradica-
tion experience shows that developing and using a min-
imum set of indicators will likely improve data use and 
utility in the field [24]. Targeted implementation and 
supervision is possible when good quality and real-time 
information is available [28].
There is a risk that elimination programmes are not 
flexible enough to adapt to conditions that continuously 
evolve as a country approaches zero local malaria cases. 
Instead of a ‘business as usual’ attitude, successful pro-
grammes in the case-studies constantly adapted new 
techniques and tools. Awareness and use of new tools 
is facilitated by having access to published and grey lit-
erature and to forums that bring together countries and 
partners to share experiences. In addition, strong pro-
grammes identified evolving threats to elimination, such 
as major development projects, and worked with other 
Ministries and the private sector to minimize the risks. In 
some cases, effective collaborations can entail contract-
ing out services to private companies or NGOs.
Conclusion
Global malaria eradication will require well-managed 
malaria programmes providing high quality implementa-
tion of evidence-based strategies, founded upon strong 
surveillance and response strategies tailored to the sub-
national level transmission context, with adequate fund-
ing and human resources to sustain malaria elimination 
and prevention of reintroduction. A first step toward 
achieving this goal is to align national malaria operational 
plans, broken down to the subnational level, with the 
current operational and implementation guides, the GTS 
and the AIM. Roles and responsibilities at each level and 
across agencies must be clarified, including the multi-
sectoral collaborators that will be integral to achieving 
elimination.
Management of malaria programmes may be enhanced 
by further training in supervision and management skills. 
The most technically savvy workers typically lack man-
agement experience [24]. An assessment of management 
practices and skills specific for malaria elimination may 
be helpful, in addition to workshops on organizational 
learning, problem solving, and financial management 
which can build morale in addition to skills [27, 30].
Based on evidence from other disease eradication pro-
grammes, there is a need to develop a minimum set of 
indicators that relate to elimination and eradication goals. 
Malaria programmes must have well-functioning real-time 
information systems and capacity for analysis with timely 
feedback to the field. Programme planning and targeting 
will not happen without access to good data and analysis.
Lastly, as seen from the gaps in information and evi-
dence provided in the case-studies, it is clear that national 
operational plans must be accompanied by a portfolio of 
context-specific, programme management-related opera-
tional/implementation research that the programme will 
use to adapt and adjust strategies and interventions to 
achieve the highest level of impact. There are still impor-
tant gaps in evidence, such as how effective supervision 
is carried out, how workers are best motivated, and how 
to improve performance and retention of health work-
ers in resource-constrained environments [21]. There are 
also evidence gaps on incentives and their use, in particu-
lar when working with community health workers [26]. 
Implementation of evidence-based, updated strategies 
along with building management and supervisory skills 
will move malaria programmes towards elimination and 
support steady progress towards global eradication.
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